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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter 
is pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2A-2(i) (1953 as amended). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Child support and alimony proceedings are equitable in nature 
and are not to be disturbed unless the Trial Court abused its 
discretion. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Ut. 1985) . 
This is a different standard than Plaintiff is citing. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUES ON REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS APPELLANT BRIEF 
1. Was Plaintiff's Trial Court Motion to Alter or Amend the 
Trial Court's ruling regarding child support a Rule 59 Motion of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore barred by the 
Appellate Court Decision dated February 7, 1994, which limited 
Plaintiff's Appeal to issues solely under Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure? 
2. If Plaintiff's Motion could be categorized as one under 
Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, did the Trial Court 
abuse its discretion when it calculated child support based on a 
Sole Custody Worksheet where Plaintiff failed to prove at the Trial 
Court that this was a joint physical custody situation or that he 
had contributed to the child's needs beyond regular child support, 
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where Defendant was awarded no alimony, and where Plaintiff was 
merely granted extended visitation? 
ISSUES ON CROSS APPEAL 
1. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to award Defendant 
alimony for at least two (2) years or even temporary alimony up to 
the date of the Divorce where this is a six (6) year marriage and 
where the Plaintiff's income exceeded the Defendant's income by 
more that $1,000.00 per month, and the evidence indicated that 
Defendant had specific need of alimony and the Plaintiff had 
available income to pay alimony to Defendant? 
2. Did the Trial Court err in dividing the parties' savings 
account based on the value at the date of separation rather than 
the date of divorce, where it considered Plaintiff's premarital 
savings when those savings had been gifted and co-mingled into the 
marriage, and where the Trial Court gave Plaintiff a full credit 
for the $3,000.00 pre-marital savings when in fact Plaintiff had 
already received one-half (M) of his premarital savings back? 
3 . Did the Trial Court err in only awarding Defendant a lump 
sum of $1,500.00, which represented an award for equitable division 
of Plaintiff's net earnings from the date of separation to the date 
of divorce and as attorney fees when Defendant had over $5,600.00 
in attorney fees and over $1,000.00 in expert witness costs? 
4. Did the Trial Court err in allowing Plaintiff visitation 
with the minor child from Wednesday through Sunday every other 
week, when the child was only three (3) years old, was accustomed 
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to visiting with Plaintiff under a regular visitation schedule and 
the Trial Court failed to give specific findings to justify a 
deviation from the standard visitation guidelines? 
STATUTE, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, 
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct 
the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury 
or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of 
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a 
fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more 
of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or 
special verdict, or to a finding on any questions submitted to 
them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the 
affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could 
not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict 
or other decision or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be 
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
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(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a 
new trial is made undei Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it 
shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial 
is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The 
opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve 
opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an 
additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for 
good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The 
court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new 
trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on 
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds 
therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter 
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after 
entry of the judgment. 
Rule 60(b)# Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered 
evidence; fraud/ etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of 
an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an 
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4 (e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which 
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1) , (2) , (3) , or (4) , not more 
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 
or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
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Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
Award of costs, attorney and witness fees - Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, 
and in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, 
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and 
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to 
enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The 
order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, 
the court may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that 
the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The 
court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against 
a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters in 
the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1) , the court may 
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the action, 
for the separate support and maintenance of the other party and of 
any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the 
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of the 
action or in the final order or judgment. 
Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annotated 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the 
property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a denial of 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend or Alter the Judgment wherein Plaintiff 
requested a calculation of child support based upon a Joint Custody 
Worksheet rather than upon the Sole Custody Worksheet. The 
Defendant responds to that appeal and also cross-appeals from the 
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Decree of Divorce and the denial of Defendant's Rule 60(a) Motion, 
and seeks alimony, a fair division of savings, attorney fees, and 
reduction of visitation. 
B. Course of Proceedings, Plaintiff and Defendant were 
married on July 27, 1987. One (1) child was born as issue of the 
marriage and his name is JOSHUA J. UDY, born August 1, 1990. 
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for divorce on September 21, 
1992. (R.O.A. 1-6). A temporary order to show cause hearing was 
held on October 8, 1992, with an Order dated October 22, 1992, 
awarding Defendant primary custody of the minor child subject to 
Plaintiff's visitation and also awarding Defendant $150.00 per 
month as child support to commence October, 1992 forward. The 
Court did not award temporary alimony or any attorney fees at that 
time. The Court did allow the father to have possession of the 
family home. (R.O.A. 27-31). Defendant objected to the Temporary 
Order on Order to Show Cause regarding alimony, child support, and 
attorney fees. (R.O.A. 25-26). On January 21, 1993, Plaintiff 
filed for another Temporary Order on Order to Show Cause requesting 
joint physical custody and Defendant filed a Counter Order to Show 
Cause. A hearing was held February 11, 1993, and the Court made 
another Order on Order to Show Cause dated March 18, 1993, again 
granting Defendant primary custody of the minor child, subject to 
Plaintiff's visitation and allowed the parties to hire two (2) 
separate evaluators to complete a home study evaluation. 
Plaintiff's request for joint custody was denied. The Court then 
ordered Plaintiff to pay $275.00 a month in child support. (R.O.A. 
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81-86) . Plaintiff and Defendant both filed status reports on the 
issues for trial. (R.O.A. 97 - 109). The final trial was held on 
September 1, 1993, wherein the Court again awarded Defendant sole 
custody of the minor child subject to Plaintiff's expanded 
visitation. The Court also ordered Plaintiff to pay $273.00 a 
month in child support pursuant to the Sole Custody Worksheet, and 
to pay Plaintiff $1,500.00 which represented an equitable 
adjustment to the property award and a partial award of Defendant's 
attorney fees. The Trial Court did not award Defendant any 
alimony. (R.O.A. Decree of Divorce 178 - 185). Defendant filed a 
Rule 60(a) Motion to have the Court correct the $1,500.00 lump sum 
payment because of the clerical error committed by the Court. 
(R.O.A. 117 - 119) . On October 1, 1993, Plaintiff filed a Motion to 
Base Child Support on a Joint Custody Worksheet. The Court denied 
both Defendant's and Plaintiff's Motions. Plaintiff filed Notice 
of Appeal regarding the Joint Custody Worksheet and Defendant filed 
Notice of Cross-Appeal regarding alimony, division of assets, 
attorney fees and the excessive expansion of visitation. On 
February 7, 1994, the Appellate Court limited Plaintiff's appeal 
solely to issues which fit under a Rule 60(b) Motion. 
C. Disposition of the Trial Court. As previously stated, 
the Trial Court ruled on September 1, 1993, with Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law entered on November 5, 1993, with an amended 
Decree entered on November 23, 1993. The Defendant was awarded 
sole custody of the minor child subject to Plaintiff's expanded 
visitation rights. Plaintiff was ordered to pay child support 
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pursuant to the Sole Custody Worksheet of $273.00 per month. 
Defendant was awarded $1,500.00 as an equitable adjustment on 
property and attorney fees. Defendant was not awarded any alimony. 
D. Statement of Facts. 
1. Facts on Plaintiffs Rule 59/60 (b) Motion. Plaintiff's 
Motion to Base Child Support on a Joint Custody Worksheet claims to 
be made under both Rule 59 and Rule 60. (R.O.A. 126-127) . However, 
the Motion itself does not specify any grounds. The Appellate 
Court limited Plaintiff's appeal to only those issues in his motion 
which could fit under Rule 60(b). Plaintiff's entire argument was 
based on judicial error and a request to amend or alter the 
judgment to conform with the law. Plaintiff did not file any 
supporting affidavits. Plaintiff's argument fits squarely within 
Rule 59(a), (6) or (7) or 59(e) and as such it cannot also fit 
under Rule 60. Attached is a copy of the Order denying Plaintiff's 
Motion, which Order incorporated Defendant's objections to 
Plaintiff's Motion as the findings (See Addendum "1"). 
2. Facts on Sole Custody Worksheet for Child Support. 
Plaintiff and Defendant had different work schedules in 1992 where 
Plaintiff worked nights and Defendant worked days. (R.O.A. 2). 
Plaintiff watched the minor child while Defendant was at work. 
During a hearing on October 8, 1993 for temporary custody and 
support, Defendant was awarded sole custody of the minor child, but 
Plaintiff was allowed to watch the child while Defendant was at 
work. (R.O.A. 27-31). The Court calculated the child support 
obligation at $150.00 per month primarily because Plaintiff was 
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tending the minor child and providing two (2) meals each day for 
the child. This was not according to the standard child support 
schedule and the Court gave no specific reasons in the minute entry 
for deviating from the schedule. (R.O.A. 20) . However, in January, 
1993, Plaintiff voluntarily changed his work schedule to days and 
no longer provided daycare for the child. (R.O.A. 47 and 66) . 
The Court, on February 11, 1993, again awarded Defendant sole 
custody, but this time required Plaintiff to pay child support of 
$275.00 per month based on a Sole Custody Worksheet, primarily 
because Plaintiff was no longer providing daycare services. 
(R.O.A. 83) . On September 1, 1993, the Trial Court received 
Defendant's Sole Custody Child Support Worksheet as the sole 
evidence regarding child support. Plaintiff failed to submit a 
calculation a joint physical custody worksheet on child support. 
To the contrary, Plaintiff placed in his budget that he was paying 
and would continue to pay $275.00 per month in child support. 
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit #2 attached as Addendum "2".) Plaintiff 
never objected to Defendant's Sole Custody Child Support Worksheet. 
(R.O.A. 314). Plaintiff's counsel in closing argument stated his 
client was prepared to pay child support on whatever amount the 
Court deemed proper. (R.O.A. 327) . Plaintiff never proved at Court 
that he contributed to extra expenses for the child above and 
beyond child support. Plaintiff only showed that he paid $13.00 a 
month to a book club that existed prior to the divorce, that he 
paid $250.00 for clothes each year and that he estimated paying 
$300.00 in gifts for the child for a year. (See Plaintiff's Trial 
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Exhibit #2 attached as Addendum "2".) Plaintiff indicated he had 
paid some for food on the child, but that calculation started in 
August, 1992, when he was feeding the child during the day. 
Plaintiff attempted to create new evidence and retry the case on 
page 22 and 23 of his Appellate Brief, claiming he is paying 
additional expenses for the child. What the facts actually show is 
Plaintiff was awarded standard visitation with really only one (1) 
extra night of visitation every other week, that is Thursday of the 
Plaintiff's weekend (under standard visitation Plaintiff gets every 
Wednesday evening and every other Friday to Sunday already). That 
amounts to just 26 extra nights per year and for the extra 26 
nights Plaintiff expects to reduce child support from $3,276.00 per 
year (12 x $273.00) to $1,392.00 per year (12 x $116.00) , a savings 
of over $1,884.00 for just 26 nights or $72.45 for each night. The 
Standard Visitation Schedule itself gives a visiting parent at 
least 89 overnights with the child, which is twenty-five percent 
(25%) of the overnights per year (see U.C.A. § 30-3-35, 2 nights 
for 24 weekends =48, 26 nights for 4 weeks of summer visitation, 
16 nights on holidays, particularly with Christmas, which may have 
5 nights alone: total nights = 89 -s- 365 = 25%). 
Moreover, either Custody Worksheet indicates that the total 
support obligation to both parents is $477.00 per month or about 
$16.00 per day (477 + 365 = 16) . (See Defendant's Trial Exhibit #5 
attached as Addendum "3".) However, Plaintiff desires to change 
the child support of $273.00 per month to less than $116.00 per 
month (a net difference of $157.00 per month) based on only two (2) 
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extra nights of visitation per month (i.e. two (2) Thursdays in the 
month), which actually amounts to a reduction of $72.46 per day. 
The reduction should be at most $8.00 a night (i.e. M of $16.00) to 
be fair. The percentage adjustments under the Joint Custody 
Worksheet tables do not fairly adjust support. 
3. Facts on Alimony. Defendant's gross wage was 
approximately $1,678.00 and her net wage was approximately 
$1,174.60 per month. (R.O.A. 312 and Defendant's Trial Exhibit 
#3). The Defendant's monthly budget was approximately $1,165.00 
on the date of divorce, per month. (Defendant's Trial Exhibit #3) . 
Thus, the Defendant had no extra spendable income available. 
(R.O.A. 306) . 
The Plaintiff's gross income was approximately $2,765.00 per 
month and his net pay was approximately $1,867.00 per month. 
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit #1). The Plaintiff's budget submitted 
to the Court was for $1,887.00 per month but this budget included 
a gift fund of $79.17 per month, miscellaneous extra spending of 
$173.33 per month, plus savings of $216.00 per month. (Plaintiff's 
Trial Exhibit #2) . After subtracting these three (3) items off the 
budget, Plaintiff is really only spending $1,418.50 per month and 
has a net spendable income of $448.50 per month compared to the 
Defendant's inability to meet her basic needs. 
Plaintiff and Defendant separated in August, 1992 and 
Defendant did not receive any temporary alimony from August, 1992 
until the date of divorce and the Court did not award alimony in 
the Divorce Decree. (R.O.A. 183). This allowed the Plaintiff to 
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receive more money during the date of separation than Defendant 
received. 
The Defendant calculated, using the gross income method, that 
the Plaintiff should owe Defendant alimony of $496.00 per month 
times at least 12 months for a total of $5,952.00. (Defendant's 
Trial Exhibit #6) . The Defendant also asked that alimony continue 
for an appropriate length of time to allow Defendant to get on her 
feet since she had to move out of the family home, set up her own 
apartment, buy new furniture, spend all of her savings to pay Court 
costs, attorney fees and bills (over $9,000.00) while Defendant was 
able to keep at least $7,500.00 of his $9,000.00 savings in tact. 
(R.O.A. 337 to 339). The Court did not award Defendant any 
alimony. 
4. Facts on Division of Assets and Savings. Defendant also 
requested the Court to split whatever net income Plaintiff was able 
to make in excess of the Defendant during the time of separation as 
a marital asset. (R.O.A. 277) . The evidence showed that Plaintiff 
had at least $7,500.00 left in savings and that Defendant had zero. 
The Court ruled that since the Plaintiff had $1,867.00 per month 
net income as opposed to the Defendant's net income of $1,3 97.00, 
that there was a difference of $530.00 per month and that the 
parties had been separated for nearly a year so that the Plaintiff 
had available to him at least $6,360.00 (12 x $530.00) more than 
the Defendant. (R.O.A. 154). The Court then offset Plaintiff's 
pre-marital savings of $3,000.00 against this $6,360.00 difference 
to come up with $3,360.00. (R.O.A. 155). The Court failed to 
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observe the evidence at trial which proved the pre-marital savings 
had been commingled and was no longer a separate asset. The Court 
basically split the $3,360.00 50/50 and awarded Defendant 
$1,500.00. The Court in its calculation, failed to consider that 
Plaintiff had already been awarded one-half (1/2) or $1,500.00 of 
his pre-marital savings when Plaintiff took the original $9,000.00. 
The Court also ignored the fact that Plaintiff had $7,500.00 in 
savings that should have been split 50/50 with Defendant on the 
date of divorce. (R.O.A. 278) . Accordingly, the Court should have 
granted Defendant an equitable division of the property, $3,750.00 
to the Defendant but instead only awarded $1,500.00. 
5. Facts on Attorney Fees. Defendant also submitted 
evidence regarding her attorney's fees incurred through the date of 
trial totalling $5,643.00 with Court costs of $73.00, family study 
fee of $950.00 and expert witness fee of $250.00. (Defendant's 
Trial Exhibit #4). Plaintiff testified that his fees were similar 
and that Defendant's attorney fees were therefore reasonable. 
(R.O.A. 310). Defendant argued that the Plaintiff had more money 
than the Defendant by at least $1,000.00 per month from gross wages 
and that he should be required to pay Defendant's reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in the case. (R.O.A. 278). Defendant 
demonstrated her need, in that her own income barely paid for her 
monthly living expenses, and she had spent all of her $9,000.00 
original savings while the Plaintiff, on the other hand, had the 
ability to save $530.00 every month and still had over $7,500.00 of 
his $9,000.00 original savings. (R.O.A. 277). The Court awarded 
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attorney's fees to the Defendant as part of the $1,500.00 equitable 
property award. 
6. Facts on Extended Visitation. Prior to divorce, the 
Plaintiff worked swing shift from 4:00 p.m. to 1:30 a.m. every day 
with the Defendant working day shift from 6:00 a.m. in the morning 
until 3:30 p.m. (R.O.A. 2). Plaintiff often tended the child in 
the day while Defendant was at work. (R.O.A. 2) . When the 
divorce Complaint was filed in October of 1992, the Court granted 
a temporary order awarding Defendant sole custody of the minor 
child, subject to Plaintiff's right of visitation and ability to 
tend the child when the Defendant was at work. (R.O.A. 27-31). In 
January, 1993 the Plaintiff voluntarily switched his work schedule 
to the day shift from 6:00 a.m. in the morning until 3:30 p.m. 
(R.O.A. 47) . In February of 1993, the Court modified the temporary 
order, granting Defendant sole custody subject to Plaintiff's 
visitation rights basically as outlined in the new legislative 
guidelines of U.C.A. § 30-3-35. (R.O.A. 81-86) . The parties lived 
by the statutory visitation guidelines from February, 1993 through 
September, 1993. Two (2) expert witnesses conducted a family study 
and proposed that the Defendant should be sole custodial parent 
with the Plaintiff receiving expanded visitation. (R.O.A. 144). 
At the trial Plaintiff sought joint custody and the Defendant 
sought sole custody with regular visitation. Judge Gordon J. Low 
awarded sole custody of the minor child to Defendant, and granted 
to the Plaintiff visitation pursuant to the statutory guidelines 
but expanded the visitation so that the Plaintiff's visitation 
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would begin Wednesday after work rather than Friday after work 
every other weekend. (R.O.A. 145-146). Defendant contested this 
award stating that it was too many days in a row for the minor 
child to be separated from the natural mother and asked the Court 
to either eliminate the Wednesday so that the visitation would 
start on Thursday after work instead of Wednesday or permit the 
Defendant to visit the child on Friday so that the child is not 
absent from the mother for five (5) days straight. (R.O.A. 302). 
The Defendant is basically appealing the Court's decision to grant 
extended visitation to the Plaintiff based on the parties' work 
schedules, the prior historical visitation that the parties had 
between one another up to the date of divorce and on the fact that 
the minor child was too young to be away from his mother for five 
(5) days out of seven (7) in one (1) week. A younger child needs 
more stability than an older child and this visitation schedule 
creates too much instability. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate to the Appellate Court 
that his Rule 59 and 60 Motion is anything but a Rule 59 Motion and 
therefore barred on appeal for untimely notice of appeal. 
Plaintiff has attempted to argue that he is claiming judicial 
error in the calculation of child support and that judicial error 
fits under Rule 60(b)(1). However, judicial error is properly 
corrected with a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a) (6) or (7) 
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or under a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) . 
Plaintiff's appeal is therefore barred. 
Even if Plaintiff could fit his motion under Rule 60(b)(1), 
his request for a joint custody child support worksheet still fails 
for several reasons. Plaintiff was not awarded joint physical 
custody, but merely expanded visitation of one (1) night every 
other week. Plaintiff further failed to show he was contributing 
significantly to the child's expenses above and beyond normal child 
support, daycare and insurance and medical bills. Plaintiff failed 
to submit evidence at the Trial Court requesting joint custody 
child support, but instead, inserted sole custody child support 
amounts in his budget and figures and told the Court he would abide 
by any support ordered since his primary concern was visitation and 
not money. 
Defendant is entitled to alimony in this six (6) year 
marriage. Plaintiff earns over $1,000.00 gross income per month 
more than Defendant. Plaintiff's net income per month exceeded 
Defendant's by $530.00. Plaintiff had the advantage, while still 
married, to save net income of $6,360.00 in the twelve (12) month 
separation time. Defendant had no savings on the date of divorce 
and Plaintiff had over $7,500.00 in savings. Defendant 
demonstrated that she had to move out the family home, buy new 
furniture and get re-established while Plaintiff was able to 
refinance his home to lower his payments. Defendant's budget was 
over $1,150.00 per month and her net take home pay was only 
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$1,167.00. The Trial Court failed to specify the grounds in the 
Findings for denial of alimony and the case should be remanded. 
Defendant is entitled to an award of fifty percent (50%) of 
the marital saving account on the date of divorce, which account 
had $7,500.00 therein and Plaintiff is not entitled to any offset 
for alleged pre-marital property since Plaintiff gifted this to 
Defendant or commingled it into the marital estate. Even if 
Plaintiff were to be given an offset, the Trial Court offset 
$1,500 . 00 too much. 
Defendant is also entitled to an award for $5,600.00 in 
attorney fees and $950.00 in family study costs and $250.00 in 
expert witness fees. The Trial Court erroneously included 
Defendant's attorney fee award with the equitable property award 
and failed to adequately compensate Defendant. Defendant also asks 
for all attorney fees and costs of appeal should she prevail. 
Defendant further requests that the Appellate Court remand the 
Order regarding expanded visitation and order the Trial Court to 
limit visitation to the standard schedule or to at least not more 
than from Thursday evening to Sunday evening on Plaintiff's 
weekend, giving Plaintiff an extra day every other weekend, where 
the tenderness of the child's years and need for stability justify 
such a result. The Trial Court failed to make adequate findings to 
support the expanded visitation and the law requires that this case 
be remanded. 
18 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL IS LIMITED BY ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 7, 
1994 TO GROUNDS OR ISSUES UNDER RULE 60 OF UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PLAINTIFF HAS NO SUCH GROUNDS. 
Plaintiff's issues on appeal are limited to those which fit 
under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in Plaintiff's 
Motion to the Trial Court. However, Plaintiff's Motion to Base 
Child Support on Joint Custody Worksheet dated October 1, 1993, 
fits entirely under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Therefore none of Plaintiff's issues survived for appeal. 
(a) THE SUBSTANCE OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION WAS A RULE 
59 MOTION AND IS BARRED ON APPEAL. 
Plaintiff asked in his Rule 59 Motion that the Court change 
its sole custody child support award to a joint custody child 
support award. Plaintiff used as grounds for the requested change 
evidence that was previously supplied to the Trial Court. Thus, 
Plaintiff was asking the court to alter or amend its ruling based 
on existing evidence. 
The Plaintiff did not file an affidavit with his Rule 59 
Motion so the Motion could not be one under Rule 59(a) (1) , (2) , (3) 
or (4) since these require affidavits. (See Rule 59(c).) However, 
Plaintiff's Motion clearly fits under Rule 59(a)(6) or (7) or 
59(e). The Plaintiff admits in his Appellate Brief that he was 
asking the Trial Court to change its decision since Plaintiff 
thought it was against the law, which is Rule 59(a) (6) , or because 
the judge made an error in applying the law, which is Rule 59(a) (7) 
or 59(e). 
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Plaintiff admits his argument is one of judicial error. 
Plaintiff attempts to state that judicial error can be corrected 
under Rule (60(b) (1) for mistake. However, judicial error is 
corrected most commonly under Rule 59(a) (6) and (7) and 59(e) . The 
substance of Plaintiff's argument is purely Rule 59 and substance 
over style should govern, particularly where Plaintiff failed to 
specify in his Motion the proper grounds. The substance of 
Plaintiff's motion fits under Rule 59 even though Plaintiff 
erroneously called it a Rule 60 Motion as well. Because 
Plaintiff's arguments are entirely founded on categories covered by 
Rule 59(a)(5), (6) or (7) as held by the Trial Court (See R.O.A. 
204 and 139) or Rule 59(e) , his appeal should be dismissed pursuant 
to the Appellate Court Order dated February 7, 1994. 
(b) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION DOES NOT FIT UNDER ANY 
CATEGORY IN RULE 60. 
Plaintiff's Motion is not a Rule 60(a) motion for 
clerical mistake since Plaintiff claims judicial error. 
"The distinction between judicial error and 
clerical error does not depend upon who made 
it. Rather it depends on whether it was made 
in rendering the judgment (judicial error) or 
in recording the judgment as rendered 
(clerical error). . . such an error (judicial 
error) must be corrected by a timely motion 
for a new trial (Rule 59) . by timely appealing 
the matter, or by an independent action . . . " 
Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah P.2d 314, 471 
P.2d 143, 145 (Ut. 1970). (Emphasis added) 
Plaintiff is claiming judicial error and not clerical 
error and Rule 60(a) is not applicable. Note that judicial 
error is corrected by Rule 59 and not Rule 60 as Plaintiff 
tries to argue. 
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Nor does Plaintiff's Motion fall under Rule 60(b) (1) for 
mistake as Plaintiff claims. Plaintiff equates mistake with 
judicial error. However, the Court in Richards v. Siddoway, 
held that judicial error is corrected by a timely motion for 
a new trial which is Rule 59. Id. at 145. Again, substance 
outweighs form and Plaintiff should not be allowed to avoid 
the substance of Rule 59 by claiming Rule (60(b)(1) was the 
form of his argument when Plaintiff failed to even state the 
specific grounds in his Motion. 
In addition, since Plaintiff failed to file an affidavit 
in support of his Motion, Rule 59(c) would limit Plaintiff's 
Motion to causes other than those found in Rule 59(a) (1) (2) (3) 
or (4) . Plaintiff would likewise be barred from falling 
within any category of Rule 60 (b) that correlates to Rule 
59(a) (1) (2) (3) or (4) by that same logic. Rule 60(b) (1) and 
(2) correlate closely if not identically with Rule 59(a)(3) 
and (4) (i.e. mistake is the same thing as accident or 
surprise) and Rule 60(b)(1) is not applicable in this case. 
Of all the other categories from Rule 60(b)(2) through 
(7), only Rule 60(b)(7) even comes close to Plaintiff's 
Motion. However, for an action to fall under Rule 60(b)(7) 
Plaintiff must not only show that none of the grounds from 
Rule 60(b)(1) through (6) were applicable, but also that no 
grounds under Rule 59 were applicable either. See Laub v. 
South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Ut. 1982) (which 
restricts subparagraph 60(b)(7) to claims that don't fit in 
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the other subparagraphs of Rule 60(b)). Plaintiff's Motion 
does in fact fit under Rule 59 and, therefore, Rule 60(b)(7) 
should not apply, 
(c) SUMMARY 
As a result of procedural rules, Plaintiff has 
limited himself in the scope of his appeal to grounds 
that only fit under Rule 60 (b) . Plaintiff has no such 
grounds. Plaintiff's Motion in substance is a Rule 59 
Motion and that is how the Trial Court treated it. 
Because Plaintiff's Motion fits under Rule 59, 
Plaintiff's Motion is barred and should therefore be 
dismissed on appeal in its entirety. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION COULD BE CATEGORIZED AS ONE 
UNDER RULE 60, PLAINTIFF STILL CANNOT PREVAIL BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVE HE HAD "JOINT PHYSICAL" CUSTODY 
OR THAT HE "CONTRIBUTED TO THE CHILD'S EXPENSES" IN 
ADDITION TO PAYING CHILD SUPPORT. 
Plaintiff failed to prove at trial that he was entitled to 
have child support calculated pursuant to a joint custody 
worksheet. 
(a) PLAINTIFF NEVER SUBMITTED EVIDENCE FOR OR 
REQUESTED A JOINT CUSTODY WORKSHEET AT TRIAL, 
BUT INSTEAD AGREED TO FOLLOW THE COURT'S ORDER 
ON CHILD SUPPORT. 
Plaintiff never submitted to the Trial Court any requests 
that child support be calculated pursuant to a Joint Custody 
Worksheet. In fact, Plaintiff did not even submit a Joint 
Custody Worksheet to the Court as an exhibit at trial. 
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To the contrary, Plaintiff accepted Defendant's Sole 
Custody Child Support Worksheet calculation as Defendant's 
Exhibit "5" and told the court in closing argument the 
following: 
"Mr. Thorne: I have no objections to [Defendant's 
exhibit] one through five." Transcript page 85 
lines 9 and 10 (R.O.A. 314). 
"Mr. Thorne: The other issues in this case I think 
fall into place pretty well. I think the court 
will have to tell us on child support whether we 
compute that on a joint custody arrangement or is 
it sole custody. I think whatever it is, Mr. Udy 
is prepared to work with it." (Emphasis added). 
Transcript page 98 line 17 to 22 (R.O.A. 98). 
Plaintiff was always trying to portray that he was more 
concerned about having time with his child for the best 
interest of the child regardless of the money side of things. 
Plaintiff did not want to give the Trial Court the impression 
he was seeking joint custody merely to reduce child support 
and this testimony came through to the Trial Judge. Plaintiff 
even put in his budget, Plaintiff's Exhibit "2", that he was 
paying $275.00 a month (a sole custody child support amount) 
as child support, so alimony and attorney fees and debt 
allocation could be reduced based on this higher child support 
amount. Plaintiff should not be allowed to change his 
position now. 
(b) PLAINTIFF WAS NOT AWARDED JOINT PHYSICAL 
CUSTODY BUT ONLY "EXPANDED VISITATION". 
The court never awarded Plaintiff joint physical custody 
in any of the temporary orders or at trial. The evidence was 
clear and overwhelming at trial, both family study experts 
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agreeing, that sole custody to Defendant was the appropriate 
award. The Trial Court then awarded Plaintiff the standard 
visitation but tweaked it a little and expanded visitation on 
Plaintiff's weekend only. This expansion did not give 
Plaintiff joint physical custody, but just a little more time 
after a full working day, to see the child on every other 
Thursday night. The Trial Court treated this as an expansion 
to visitation, but really no different for child support 
purposes. As a result, Plaintiff's extra visitation time was 
given to help the child and not to reduce support to the 
child's detriment. 
Plaintiff argues that he has the child at night more than 
33% of the time. However, even in standard visitation 
schedules, a father may have the minor child as much as 25% of 
the nights. That is why most states do not give a reduction 
for joint custody unless the time with the child exceeds 3 0% 
to 50%. Utah is one of the only states with joint custody 
reductions starting at 25%. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit F to 
Plaintiff's Appellate Brief.) Most states give the Court 
discretion on how to reduce the support in extended visitation 
situations, usually by just 50% of the actual support paid for 
those days. Utah also gives noncustodial parents a 50% 
reduction in support when they have the child more than 25 out 
of 3 0 consecutive days. Plaintiff, at most, received extended 
visitation on every other Thursday and logically should only 
receive the 50% reduction in support for the actual days 
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visited, but only if they are consecutive and they were not in 
this case. 
(c) PLAINTIFF NEVER ESTABLISHED EVIDENCE THAT 
PLAINTIFF CONTRIBUTED TO THE CHILD'S NEEDS 
BEYOND REGULAR CHILD SUPPORT. 
Section 78-45-2(7) of U.C.A. (1953, as amended) provides 
that: 
"Joint physical custody means the child stays 
with each parent overnight for more than 25% 
of the year, and both parents contribute to 
the expenses of the child in addition to 
paying child support." (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff never introduced evidence or focused on whether 
he was or would contribute to the expenses of the child in 
addition to paying standard child support. Plaintiff said he 
would pay a book club membership of $13.00 per month, but this 
existed prior to the divorce. Plaintiff said he would buy 
clothes and gifts for the child, but all fathers should do 
that. Plaintiff indicated he bought some meals for the child, 
but again, all fathers buy food while exercising their weekend 
visitation. Plaintiff failed to show the Court he contributed 
or would contribute to the child's expenses in a substantial 
way above and beyond normal child support. The Trial Court 
found that Plaintiff failed to prove he was contributing to 
the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support 
(See R.O.A. 138 and 204). If Plaintiff needed $1,887.00 per 
month to support himself, then Defendant would need that and 
more to support herself and the minor child as well. (See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "2".) Defendant paid just as much as 
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Plaintiff did for daycare, insurance, and uninsured medical 
costs and a reduction in child support would have harmed 
Defendant and the child much more than it infringed on 
Plaintiff for the expense of just 26 extra Thursday nights a 
year. 
Both Sole and Joint Child Support Worksheets indicate a 
total support obligation of $477.00 per month or $16.00 per 
day. To reduce Plaintiff's child support to either $116.00 
per month or $53.00 per month as Plaintiff suggests (which is 
at least $72.00 per day reduction) for just 2 extra nights of 
visitation (i.e. Thursday night since Plaintiff and Defendant 
share daycare on Thursdays), would punish Defendant and the 
child unfairly. If any reduction is due, it should only be 
for 2 nights a month x $8.00 (since only 1/2 of day is used) . 
Why should Plaintiff receive a reduction larger than what 
those days are actually worth in total when this was treated 
as expanded visitation and not joint physical custody? 
The court, in its discretion, applied the appropriate 
child support, after reviewing the factors and evidence that 
a Sole Custody Child Support Worksheet was the applicable 
guide for the court. The Trial Court found, in rebutting the 
presumption to use a joint custody worksheet, that the factors 
of primary residence, alimony, child's needs, ability to pay 
for extra items as well as other equities justified a sole 




DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO ALIMONY IN A SIX-YEAR MARRIAGE 
WHERE PLAINTIFF'S INCOME IS $1,000.00 MORE PER MONTH THAN 
DEFENDANT'S AND PLAINTIFF HAS AVAILABLE INCOME AND 
DEFENDANT CAN BARELY MEET HER LIVING EXPENSES. 
Temporary alimony is allowed under U. C. A. § 30-3-3(3) which 
provides: 
"(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the 
court may order a party to provide money, during the 
pendency of the action, for the separate support and 
maintenance of the other party and of any children in the 
custody of the other party." 
Alimony is and has been awarded in short-term marriages to 
temporarily equalize the parties' standard of living as closely as 
possible or to assist the spouse to meet living expenses while she 
is readjusting her affairs and life. See Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 
P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (5-year marriage awarded alimony of 
$800.00 per month for 2 years.) The basic determination in all 
alimony cases as stated in Rappleye at page 264 is: 
"In awarding alimony, appellate courts require the trial 
court to consider each of the following three factors: 
(1) the financial condition and needs of the receiving 
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to 
produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and (3) 
the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. 
If these three factors have been considered, we will not 
disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion. Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 567 
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting Schindler v. Schindler, 776 
P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App. 1989)) (citation omitted.) 
A denial of alimony is a clear abuse of discretion if the 
record does not reveal that the court considered or made adequate 
findings on the three factors regarding alimony. See Canning v. 
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Canning, 744 P. 2d 325, 326 (Ut. App. 1987) . The Court in Willev v. 
Willev, 227 Utah Advance Rep 3 9 (Nov. 29, 1993) quoting Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 492 stated: 
"Failure to consider the three [alimony] factors in 
fashioning an alimony award constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. 'Thus the trial court must make sufficiently 
detailed findings on each factor to enable the receiving 
court to ensure that the trial courts discretionary 
determination was rationally based upon' the three 
[alimony] factors." 
In the present case, the Trial Court did not enumerate any 
findings on Defendant's financial condition and needs or upon the 
Plaintiff's financial condition and needs. The only findings made 
were on the parties' gross income and alleged net income. 
The denial of alimony to Defendant creates a disparity in 
annual incomes of the parties'. Plaintiff earns at least $1,000.00 
gross income a month more than Defendant ($2,786.00 vs. $1,720.00). 
Plaintiff's alleged budgeted expenses totaled $1,887.37 but 
included $216.67 for savings, $173.33 for unaccounted miscellaneous 
spending, and $79.00 in gifts. Plaintiff's more realistic budget 
is around $1,418.50 per month when these items are removed. 
Plaintiff's alleged net income was $1,867.00 per month. 
Defendant's alleged budget was about $1,165.00 per month. 
Defendant's alleged net income was about $1,174.6 0 according to 
Defendant. Under these facts it is clear that Plaintiff has a 
$448.00 per month higher standard of income than Defendant. 
Defendant is caring for herself and the child on a smaller budget 
than Plaintiff who is caring only for himself. Defendant also was 
forced due to separation, to buy new furniture and household items 
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totalling $2,500.00 to $3,000.00. Defendant also spent her entire 
savings on separation of $9,000.00 by paying $5,600.00 attorney 
fees, $1,000.00 to Derek Mason (family study), $2,500.00 
$3,000.00 for furniture. On the other hand, Plaintiff had 
$9,000.00 in savings on separation and only spent $1,500.00 pending 
the divorce with $7,500.00 of savings on the date of divorce. This 
disparity in standard of living justifies an award of alimony to 
Defendant. To equalize the standard of living and assist Defendant 
in rehabilitation, the Plaintiff should have been ordered to pay 
Defendant at least $300.00 per month in alimony for two years. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AT LEAST FIFTY PERCENT (50%) OF 
THE PARTIES' SAVINGS AS VALUED ON THE DATE OF DIVORCE. 
The Trial Court awarded Defendant $1,500.00 in the form of 
cash from savings or potential savings by Plaintiff and for 
Defendant's attorney fees. The evidence at trial showed that 
Plaintiff and Defendant split $18,000.00 in savings upon separation 
giving both $9,000.00. Plaintiff had at least $7,500.00 in savings 
on the date of divorce and Defendant had zero. Plaintiff also had 
available in spendable income from August, 1992 to September, 1993 
$530.00 more cash per month than Defendant, or $6,350.00 total. 
The Trial Court, instead of dividing all of these savings 50/50, 
offset $3,000.00 against Defendant's share of these savings using 
the theory Plaintiff had $3,000.00 in pre-marital savings. 
However, Plaintiff already had received $1,500.00 in pre-marital 
savings when he took the $9,000.00 in savings upon separation. 
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This was error for several reasons: 
(1) Property division in divorce should be valued on date of 
divorce. 
(2) Plaintiff had gifted and commingled his pre-marital 
savings and it should not be considered as a separate asset. 
(3) Plaintiff already was awarded one-half (1/2) of the 
marital savings account of $18,000.00 when he took $9,000.00 in the 
temporary order and the Trial Court credited Plaintiff for the full 
$3,000.00 as if Plaintiff had not already received one-half (1/2) 
of the $3,000.00 in savings. 
(a) The General rule is that the marital estate is 
valued at the time of the divorce decree. 
"As a general rule, the marital estate is valued at the time 
of the divorce decree. Moreover, any deviation from the general 
rule must be supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact 
that explain the Trial Court's basis for such deviation." Rappleye 
v. Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260, 262 (Ut. App. 1993). 
In Rappleye, the Court analyzed the value of a Merrill Lynch 
cash account made on the date of separation ($58,456.00) rather 
than date of divorce ($2 0,244.00) . The court vacated the award and 
remanded the case back to the Trial Court for reconsideration. 
In the present case, the parties split a $18,000.00 savings 
account on date of separation so each had $9,000.00 a piece. On 
the date of divorce, however, Plaintiff had $7,500.00 in savings 
and Defendant had none. Plaintiff made gross income of $1,000.00 
per month more than Defendant and only paid Defendant $150.00 for 
child support for four (4) months and $275.00 in child support for 
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eight (8) months, or $2,800.00 total. Defendant had to use this on 
the child's needs as well as spend her $9,000.00 savings fighting 
the court battle and to establish a new residence. The Trial Court 
estimated that Plaintiff had $530.00 per month net income higher 
than Defendant, or $6,360.00 per year, and that Plaintiff should 
share part of this because of the disparity in savings and earnings 
over the one (1) year separation period. However, the findings do 
not show why the Trial Court deviated from the general rule of 
valuing assets on the date of divorce and not the date of 
separation. 
Defendant should have received fifty percent (50%) of the 
savings account as valued on the date of divorce (i. e. 50% of 
$7,500.00 = $3,750.00). Defendant should have also part of the 
Plaintiff's net earnings over the one-year separation period as 
alimony. Defendant should have been awarded 50% of Plaintiff's net 
earnings of $6,360.00 or another $3,180.00 as alimony, making 
Defendant's total award $6,930.00 ($3,750.00 + $3,180.00) instead 
of merely $1,500.00. 
(b) Plaintiff should not have received a $3/000.00 
offset for his premarital savings since this was 
gifted to Defendant and commingled in the marriage 
and consumed. 
There are clear guidelines on division of premarital property. 
In Mortensen v. Mortensen 760 P.2d 308 (Utah 1988) the Court ruled. 
"As a general rule, premarital property is considered 
separate property and will be retained by the party who 
brought it into the marriage unless: (1) the other spouse 
has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, 
thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, Dubois v. 
Dubois, supra, or (2) the property has been consumed or 
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its identify lost through commingling or exchanges or 
where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest 
therein to the other spouse." Id, at 308. 
Regarding placing the spouses' name on a joint account, the 
Court stated in part that it is no longer separate if: "the 
acquiring spouse places title in their joint names in such a manner 
as to evidence an intent to make it marital property." Jd. at 307. 
In the present case, Plaintiff testified as follows regarding 
his premarital assets: (Note Plaintiff claimed to have $2,800.00 in 
checking; $3,000.00 in savings and had paid $1,133.00 down on a 
house prior to marriage): 
Checking: 
Plaintiff: "No, I consider the $2,800.00 in checking to 
be a gift to the marriage." Transcript page 14 line 8.9 
(R.O.A. 243). 
Savings 
Mr. Grant: Your savings account, I'm assuming, prior to 
the marriage had your name only on it, is that right? 
Plaintiff: Yes. 
Mr. Grant: And after you married whose name showed up on 
the account? 
Plaintiff: We put Becky's name on it. 
Mr. Grant: And the reason you put her name on it was why? 
Plaintiff: Umm, so that she would also be able to 
withdraw some of the money that we placed into i t . . . . 
Mr. Grant: Did she, as a signer and co-owner of that 
account, have the right to withdraw those funds. 
Plaintiff: Yes, she did. 
Mr. Grant: And she had control over them as well as you 
had control over them? 
Plaintiff: Yes. 
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Mr. Grant: And that was back in '87. Are you able to 
trace that $3,000.00 to today's date? 
Plaintiff: Umm, not exactly, but I do know that we've 
always had at least that much money in the account. 
Mr. Grant: Money has gone in and out of that account for 
five years, right? 
Plaintiff: Yes, but we've always maintained at least 
that much in there. 
Mr. Grant: You'd agree, wouldn't you, that Becky also 
brought some valuable items into the marriage? 
Plaintiff: Umm, yes. She brought a water bed, a cedar 
chest. She claims all the wall decorations. A sewing 
machine. 
Mr. Grant: A car? 
Plaintiff: Oh, yes, the car. 
Mr. Grant: Those things are worth just as much as the 
savings account, aren't they? 
Plaintiff: No, I don't believe so. 
Transcript page 27 line 17-25; page 28 line 1-25; page 29 line 1-8. 
(R.O.A.) 256, 257, 258) . 
Home 
Mr. Grant: You would also admit that the home, 
basically, was a marital home, purchased in contemplation 
of marriage, wouldn't you? 
Plaintiff: Umm, I suppose so. 
Transcript page 29 line 9-12. (R.O.A. 258). 
The home appraised for $43,000 and Plaintiff testified the debt on 
the home upon date of divorce was below $40,000 so Plaintiff has 
received over $3,000.00 in equity on the home already. 
Mr. Grant: The debt on the home at the time you 
appraised it was forty-two nine. What is the debt now? 
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Plaintiff: Umm, it is below $40,000, because I put money 
down to refinance. (Plaintiff had put $2,500.00 to 
$3,000.00 down during the separation). 
Transcript page 29, line 24-25; page 30 line 1-3. (R.O.A. 258, 
259) . 
Defendant, on the other hand, testified on these same subjects as 
follows: 
Savings 
Mr. Grant: Regarding this $3,0 00 that Brad wants back 
out of his savings, did Brad gift that money to you when 
he put it in your joint names? 
Defendant: I believe he did, yes. 
Mr. Grant: Did he say something at that time about this 
is our money now? 
Defendant: Yes. 
Mr. Grant: What did he say? 
Defendant: I just remember him saying we'll put your 
name on the account and it will be our account from now 
on. Then at that time we both started to put money in 
it. 
Transcript page 76 line 1-12 (R.O.A. 305). 
Home 
Mr. Grant: The family home was basically a marital home 
ever since you were married, right? 
Defendant: Yeah. 
Mr. Grant: And you believe that it's worth more than $43,000? 
Defendant: I do. 
Mr. Grant: Why? 
Defendant: Because the house values have gone up. 
Transcript page 76 line 13-20 (R.O.A. 305). 
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Accordingly, Plaintiff should not have received any credit for 
the premarital assets since they were gifted to Defendant in joint 
tenancy, or consumed and their identity lost when co-mingled into 
marital assets. Also, Defendant never received any credit for 
premarital assets she brought into the marriage and Plaintiff 
received over $3,000.00 in equity in the family home that Defendant 
never shared in. 
(c) Even if Plaintiff was to receive a credit, the court 
erroneously offset $1/500.00 too much. 
The Court granted Plaintiff a $3,000.00 offset for the 
premarital items. However, the court forgot that Plaintiff and 
Defendant divided the savings 50/50, or $9,000.00 each, on 
separation so that Plaintiff already received at least $1,500.00 of 
his premarital savings. 
The Court should have only credited the remaining $1,500.00 
from the $7,500.00 savings and then awarded Defendant one-half 
(1/2) of that. Thus, $7,500.00 - $1,500.00 = $6,000.00 * 2 = 
$3,000.00, which should have been awarded to Defendant instead of 
just $1,500. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HER ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPERT 
WITNESS COSTS UNDER U. C. A. § 30-3-3 
The findings show Plaintiff and Defendant incurred at least 
$5,600 in attorney fees each and at least $1,000 each on expert 
witness fees. 
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The Trial Court, instead of explaining why Defendant was not 
entitled to all of her attorney fees and costs, limited her award 
to $1,500.00 as part of the property division and an equitable 
award for attorney fees as discussed in part IV above. 
Attorney fees and family study costs may be awarded in a 
divorce trial under U. C. A. § 30-3-3(1) . "The award must be based 
on evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the 
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees.'1 Willey v. Willey, 227 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3 9 at 43 (Ut. 
1993) . As stated in Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Ut. 
App. 1990): 
"Furthermore, 'where the evidence supporting the 
reasonableness of requested attorney fees is both 
adequate and entirely undisputed, . . . the court abuses 
its discretion in awarding less than the amount requested 
unless the reduction is warranted' by one or more of the 
above factors. Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 518 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). The trial court must, accordingly, 
identify such factors on the record and also explain its 
sua sponte reduction in order to permit meaningful review 
on appeal. " 
In the present case, Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to the 
reasonableness of the fees since each had incurred approximately 
the same amount on a complicated custody case. Defendant provided 
evidence that she had spent all of her $9,000.00 savings on her 
attorney fees, expert witnesses and moving costs to set up a new 
house. She also provided testimony that Plaintiff was able to save 
all of his $9,000.00, except perhaps for $1,500.00. Thus, 
Plaintiff had net earnings of $530.00 more a month than Defendant 
but also saved $7,500.00 more in savings. Defendant depleted her 
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savings and was in financial need. Plaintiff had the ability to 
pay and even refinanced the home during separation, spending close 
to $3,000.00. An award should have been made which exceeded the 
combined property/attorney fee award of $1,500.00 made by the 
court. The Trial Court is required to show in the findings upon 
what factors the Court relied or remand is appropriate. See Willev 
vi. Willey, page 44. 
Also, Defendant is entitled to her attorney fees on appeal if 
she prevails, where she was awarded attorney fees at trial (See 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P. 2d 1166, 1171 (Ut. 1990)) and Willey Id. at 
44. As stated in Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P. 2d 421, 427 (Ut. App. 
1990) : 
"We may order either party to pay attorney fees under 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989), including attorney fees 
incurred on appeal. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P. 2d 713, 717 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 
1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
However, before a court will award attorney fees, the 
requesting party must show that: (1) he or she is in need 
of financial assistance, and (2) the fees requested are 
reasonable. Bagshaw, 788 P. 2d at 1061. Further, we 
usually make such an award if the requesting party has 
prevailed on at least some of the issues he or she has 
raised on appeal, although under the language of Section 
3 0-3-3, we are not absolutely prohibited from making an 
award to a party who has not prevailed on appeal. See 
e.g. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 717." 
Defendant has prevailed on appeal and would request all 




VISITATION FOR CHILDREN UNDER AGE 5 SHOULD NOT BE 
EXPANDED MORE THAN FOUR (4) DAYS AT A TIME SINCE THIS 
CREATES INSTABILITY AND TOO MUCH CONFUSION WITH HIS 
PRIMARY RESIDENCE. 
Defendant was awarded sole custody subject to Plaintiff's 
standard statutory visitation schedule. The Trial Court then 
awarded Plaintiff expanded visitation by giving Plaintiff an extra 
night on Thursday (already entitled to evening on Wednesday) prior 
to Plaintiff's normal weekend visitation. Plaintiff actually 
received visitation for five (5) out of seven (7) days on the 
weekend he has visitation. 
Defendant argued that this was too much time from Defendant 
who was the sole custodian and who provided the primary residence 
and bed for the minor child for the past 9 months. The child was 
only three (3) years old. 
The two (2) expert witnesses both agreed that younger children 
need a more structured, stable environment than older children do. 
(R.O.A. 333) . They both testified that any expanded visitation 
should be bunched together on Plaintiff's weekend and Derek Mason 
thought that one (1) extra day of visitation was plenty of time. 
Defendant testified that her minor child was only three (3) 
years old and was accustomed to sleeping in his own bed and that he 
had adjusted well to the temporary visitation order from January 1, 
1993 to September 1, 1993, which was a standard visitation 
schedule. Defendant testified that the minor child's life and 
sense of who he was would be disrupted too much if expanded 
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visitation were allowed. Derek Mason concluded in his family study 
report, page 7: 
"I would recommend to the court that the current living 
arrangement be maintained, that is, Becky remains the 
primary residential parent. My recommendation is based 
on two factors. First, Joshua has been living with his 
mother and visiting his father long enough for this to 
have become a familiar, secure routine. Changing this 
structure may be difficult for him at this point in time. 
Secondly, it is my assessment that Becky has a somewhat 
better grasp of her son's needs and the parenting role 
than Brad." 
The Trial Court is required to make specific findings of fact 
as to why expanded visitation was necessary when deviation from the 
normal schedule occurs. As stated in the custody case of Barnes v. 
Barnes, 857 P.2d 257 (Ut. App. 1993) at page 259: 
"'However, to ensure the court acted within its broad 
discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's 
decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings 
and conclusions.'" Sukin, 842 P.2d at 924 (quoting 
Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988). 
. . .If the findings are legally inadequate the exercise 
of marshalling the evidence in support of the findings 
becomes futile and the appellant is under no obligation 
to marshal. Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
The Trial Court is required to make adequate findings 
regarding the best interests of the child and past 
conduct and demonstrated moral character of each of the 
parents, Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah App. 
1992) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1) (1989) ) . It is 
also required to consider which parent is most likely to 
act in the child's best interest and to make findings 
regarding that consideration. Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-10(2) (1989)). Where applicable, the court may 
also consider and make findings on other relevant 
factors." 
In this case, the Trial Court failed to make adequate findings 
which would support expanded visitation and the case should be 
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remanded for consideration of the major factors as stated in 
Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Ut. App. 1991) at page 433: 
"We believe that the choice in competing child custody 
claims should instead be based on function-related 
factors. Prominent among these, though not exclusive, is 
the identity of the primary caretaker during the 
marriage. Other factors should include the identity of 
the parent with greater flexibility to provide personal 
care for the child and the identity of the parent with 
whom the child has spent most of his or her time pending 
custody determination if that period has been lengthy. 
Another important factor should be the stability of the 
environment provided by each parent." 
Defendant desires a more limited expansion of visitation, from 
Thursday to Sunday every other week rather than from Wednesday to 
Sunday every other week to create a more stable environment for the 
child. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments above, Defendant requests that the 
Plaintiff's Appeal be dismissed since it does not fit under the 
issues of Rule 60(b), and that the no alimony award be vacated and 
remanded to the Trial Court for further findings, and that she 
actually be awarded temporary alimony of at least $300.00 per month 
for two (2) years; that Defendant be awarded one-half {%) of the 
savings account as it appeared on the date of divorce which is one-
half (M) of at least $7,500.00, that Defendant be awarded one-half 
(H) of the net earnings Plaintiff made between August 1992 and 
August 1993, which would be one-half {%) of at least $6,360.00 or 
$3,180.00; that Defendant be awarded $5,600.00 in attorney fees and 
$950.00 plus $250.00 in expert fees and her attorney fees of 
40 
$4,500.00 and costs of $384.00 for a total of $4,884.00 on this 
Appeal, and that Plaintiff's expanded visitation be limited to 
Thursday night to Sunday night every other weekend instead of from 
Wednesday to Sunday of every weekend or remanded to the Trial Court 
for further consideration. Adequate findings were not submitted to 
justify no alimony, the inadequate division of savings, the 
reduction of attorney fees and expert witness fees, and the 
expanded visitation. To deny Defendant's claim in each of these 
areas was an abuse of discretion. 
DATED this 5 day of July, 1994. 
OLSON Sc HOGGAN, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and exact copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to Plaintiff's attorney, Jeff R. 
Thorne, MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE, at 98 North Main, P.O. Box 876, 
Brigham City, Utah 843 02, and eight (8) true and correct copies to 
the Utah Court of Appeals, at 230 South 500 East, #400, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84102, this day of July, 1994. 
^7?U, 
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STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 





Civil No, 924000268 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff filed a motion to have the Court reconsider, 
pursuant to Rule 59 and Rule 60, Plaintiff's request to base child 
support upon a joint custody worksheet. Defendant filed an 
objection. The Court has review the arguments and based on 
Defendant's objections and arguments cited therein orders as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff's motion is denied. 
2. Child support will be as ordered in the Decree of Divorce, 
based on a sole custody worksheet for the reasons set forth in 
Defendant's response. 
DATED this V day of December, 1993. 
}•> 
—-Judge Gordon J. Low 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
l ^ T h o r S t e Jef f \Jcy Thorne 
Attorney for P la in t i f f , ,
 Nu^fcM-Z(^5 MJG/div/udy.ord / d t o N u
- T-53 86 
Of C 1 01993 
Jg& M 
Marlin J. Grant (#4581) 
OLSON 8c HOGGAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
123 East Main 
P.O. Box 115 
Tremonton, Utah 84337 
Telephone (801) 257-3885 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
BRADLEY J. UDY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
REBECCA RUDD UDY, 
Defendant, 
OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
JOINT CUSTODY SUPPORT WORKSHEET 
Civil No. 92400268DA 
•N 8c HOGGAN, P.C. 
TTORNEYS AT LAW 
8 8 WEST CENTER 
P.O. BOX 5 2 5 
>N. UTAH 8 4 3 2 3 - 0 5 2 5 
( 8 0 1 ) 7 5 2 - 1 5 5 1 
E M O N T O N O F F I C E : 
1 2 3 EAST MAIN 
P.O. BOX 1 1 5 
RONTON. UTAH 84337 
(801)257-3885 
Plaintiff/Husband filed for a Rule 60 and Rule 59 Motion to 
Change the Child Support from a sole custody worksheet to a joint 
custody worksheet. 
Defendant/Wife objects to this Motion for these reasons: 
1. Plaintiff/Husband does not state under what theory the 
Court should change the support (i.e. clerical error, accident or 
surprise, newly discovered evidence, error in law, mistake, 
excusable neglect, fraud, etc.). Defendant/Wife cannot imagine any 
subsection of Rule 60 or 59 that Plaintiff/Husband could 
justifiably make their argument. Their argument is in fact a 
request to have the Judge merely reconsider and make their old 
argument. 
2. Plaintiff/Husband in fact advanced the theory that the 
Court should use a joint custody worksheet (see Plaintiff's Status 
Report, page 3, item 3, dated June 1, 1993); (Plaintiff's Complaint 
asking for joint custody); (Plaintiff's Orders to Show Cause 
^pqot3o3(*&-
i$ 
N & HOGGAN. P.C. 
TTORNEYS AT LAW 
B8 WEST CENTER 
P.O. BOX 5 2 5 
N. UTAH 8 4 3 2 3 - 0 5 2 5 
( 8 0 1 ) 7 5 2 - 1 5 5 1 
I M O N T O N O F F I C E : 
1 2 3 EAST MAIN 
P O . BOX 1 1 5 
IONTON, UTAH 8 4 3 3 7 
( 8 0 1 ) 2 5 7 - 3 8 8 5 
requesting joint custody support calculations). Plaintiff/Husband 
has had his day in court and his chance to prove up why joint 
custody child support should be ordered. This matter is res 
judicata. There needs to be an end to a court order. 
3. Defendant/Wife was in fact awarded sole custody in the 
Order to Show Cause hearing held on October 8, 1992 and February 
11, 1993. Defendant/Wife was also awarded sole custody in the 
divorce on September 1, 1993. The Court had every right to follow 
the sole custody child support schedule in those instances and 
rightly did so. 
4. Only in cases of "joint physical custody" is a joint 
physical custody support worksheet used. The court awarded sole 
physical custody to Defendant/Wife and the standard statutory 
visitation guidelines, but with some expanded visitation. 
5. "Joint physical custody" is defined as "the child stays 
with each parent over night for more than twenty-five percent (25%) 
of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the 
child in addition to paying child support". U.C.A. §78-45-2(7) 
Plaintiff/Husband had his chance to prove he is paying the expenses 
of the child in addition to just paying child support and the Court 
did not make any finding that Plaintiff /Husband paid extra support. 
The Court basically found that Defendant/Wife was paying for the 
child's expenses and ordered Plaintiff/Husband to pay sole custody 
child support. This was totally in line with the support 
guidelines. Plaintiff/Husband cannot re-argue his case just 
because he failed to prove that he was contributing to the child's 
expenses. The truth is Defendant/Wife pays all costs for clothing, 
housing, and other basic needs for the child. Plaintiff/Husband 
spends for the child's needs just like every other father who has 
visitation. 
6. Defendant/Wife was not granted any alimony and she can 
barely support herself and the child on $273.00 per month in child 
support. Defendant/Wife spends in fact more than $273.00 per month 
J5« 
on the child. It would be an abuse of justice to reduce the ' 
support even more. 
7. Plaintiff/Husband has not filed an Affidavit to support I 
his motion, therefore, Rule 59(c) would restrict j 
Plaintiff/Husband's Motion to Rule 59(a) 5, 6 or 7. The only 
possible item Plaintiff/Husband could advance would be an error at 
law .since the damages are not excessive and the evidence was 
clearly present when the Court made the decision so it was not 
insufficient. The Court has the discretion, in awarding support, 
to take factors into account such as primary residence, alimony, 
child's needs, ability to pay for extra items (see U.C.A. §30-3-5; 
§78-45-7). If the guidelines are rebutted, the Court can look at 
all the factors in §78-45-7(3). The Court certainly considered 
these factors as well as other equities in awarding child support 
as it did. The award cannot therefore be challenged merely on an 
error in application of the law. 
8. Rule 60(b) requires a showing of grounds, time lines, 
plus the fact the Plaintiff /Husband would succeed on the merits of 
his case. Plaintiff/Husband had a chance to argue his merits 
already and did not succeed. His Motion is really just a request 
for reconsideration which is not allowed under the Rules. Drurv v. 
Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662 (Ut. 1966). 
si & HOGGAN, P.C. 
TORNEYS AT LAW 
8 WEST CENTER 
P.O. BOX 525 
I. UTAH 84323-0525 
SOI) 752-1551 
MONTON OFFICE 
123 EAST MAIN 
PO. BOX 1 15 
5NTON. UTAH 84337 
301) 257-3885 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Wife requests the Court to deny Plaintiff/Husband ' s 
Motion on the grounds it is not specific, fails to state proper 
grounds for the Motion, is unsupported by affidavit; is just a 
request for reconsideration and not proper under the rules, is 
unsupported by the facts and the Court has already decided upon 
Plaintiff/Husband's requests for joint support, denied the same and 
it is res judicata. Plaintiff/Husband's proper remedy is an appeal 
if he is not satisfied with the Court's first ruling. 
Defendant/Wife requests her attorney fees to defend against 
this Motion in the sum of $300.00. 
fl 
I & HOGGAN, P.C. 
ORNEYS AT LAW 
J WEST CENTER 
P O. BOX 525 
, UTAH 84323-OS25 
MD1) 752-1551 
lONTON OFFICE-
23 EAST MAIN 
».0. BOX 1 1 5 
NTON. UTAH 84337 
© 1)257-3885 
DATED this / 2- day of October, 1993. 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
Marlin J. Gsant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Joint Custody Support 
Worksheet to Plaintiff's attorney, Jeff Thorne of MANN, HADFIELD & 
THORNE, at 98 North Main, P. 0. Box 876, Brigham City, Utah 84302, 
this /Z- day of October, 1993. 
JU-\ 
Marl in J." Grar^ f 
udy.obj/mjg/div 
^o 
ADDENDUM " 2 " 
BUDGET 
Mountain Fuel 








Food for Josh and Brad 
Clothes - Brad 
Clothes - Josh 
Josh's Book Club 
Automotive Expenses 
Gift Fund 
Misc. Spending Money 
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i-93, I paid a total of 
•93, I spent a total of 
•93, I spent approximately 
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Insurance $594.60, Gas $450, Service $80, 
License $121.96, Inspection, $20, Repair $100 = $1,366.56 f 12 
Xmas,B-Day,M/F Day immediate family = $200, Josh $300, 
Brad $200, Grandparents $120, Nieces & Nephews $90, 
Friends, misc. $40, = $950.00 f 12 = 
Dining out, work breaks, recreation, misc. $40 per week x 52 - $2080 
Josh's college, unexpected expenses, truck downpayment, vacation, 
future investments, emergency fund-maintain 6 months wages in 
case of lost employment @ $50.00 per week x 52 - $2,600 f 12 = 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
REBECCA RUDD UDY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRADLEY J. UDY, Civil No. 
Defendant. 
BASE AWARD CALCULATION 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT WJ 
I! NO 6 
) ' 
) CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
) WORKSHEET 
) (Sole Custody and Paternity) 
1 
]1. Enter the combined number of natural 
| and adopted children of this mother 
{ and father. 
|2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross 
} monthly income. Refer to Instructions 
| for definition of income. 
J2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that 
| is actually paid. (Do not enter 
| alimony ordered for this case.) 
|2c. Enter previously ordered child sup-
] port. (Do not enter obligations 
| ordered for the children in this 
j case.) 
|2d. Optional: Enter the amount from Line 
| 12 of the Children in Present Home 
j Worksheet for either parent. 
|3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 
j 2a. This is the Adjusted Monthly | Gross for child support purposes. 
|4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 
j and the number of children in Line 1 | to the Support Table. Find the Base 
i Combined Support Obliqation. 
J 5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly | gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED 
j adjusted monthly aross in Line 3. 
|6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each 
| parent to obtain each parent's share 
! of the Base Support Obliqation. 
j7. Enter the child(ren)'s portion of 
] monthly medical and dental insurance 
! premiums paid to insurance company. 
Mother ! Father ! Combined j 
//////////I//////////I ! 
//////////I//////////I i ! 
//////////!//////////! ! 
$1,678.00 !$2,786.00 ! 
































mi i ii ii ii i\ 
$4,464.00 i 
i $459.00 ! 
I!UIIIIIIII\ 









Enter the monthly work or training [7777777777 
related child care expense for the ] ////////// 
children in Line 1. \ l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UIIIIIIII\ / / / / / / / / / / i 
//////////IS 225.00 
& HOGGAN, P.C. 
DRNEYS AT LAW 
WEST CENTER 




*3 EAST MAIN 
O BOX 1 15 
ITON. UTAH 84337 
> 1)257-3885 
9. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD j j 
Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the Obligor j j 
Parent. !$287.00 ! 
10. Adjusted Base Child Support Award j | 
Subtract the Obliqor's Line 7 from Line 9. !$ 267.00 j 
11. Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child j j 
Divide Line 10 by Line 1. !$ 267.00 ', 
12. CHILD CARE AWARD j j 
Multiply Line 8 by .50 to obtain obligor's share ofj j 
child care expense. Add to Line 10 only when J j 
expense is actually incurred. . |$_112.50 | 
ADDENDUM " 4 " 
BECKY UDY 
T-5386 
Attornev# s Fees/Appeal 
December 6, 1993 
Letter on Appeal and other matters. $ 23.75 
December 16, 1993 
Drafting Order, Findings and Cross Appeal. $ 95.00 
December 30, 1993 
Letter to Court on Appeal and review of Appeal. $ 47.50 
January 6, 1994 
Review of court file and telephone conference with 
DeAnn. $ 23.75 
January 13, 1994 
Review of Appeal by Jeff Thorne and office visit. $ 95.00 
January 14, 19 94 
Drafting Statement and related appeal items. $285.00 
January 18, 19 94 
Review of appellate letter, phone call to clerk, drafting 
Docketing Statement. $ 47.50 
January 20, 1994 
Drafting Memorandum and finalizing Docketing 
Statement. $190.00 
January 21, 1994 
Papers of appeal. $ 47.50 
January 27, 1994 
Appellate matters. $ 47.50 
February 16, 19 94 
Answer of appeal matters. $ 23.75 
February 17, 1994 
Research on appeal. $ 71.25 
February 23, 1994 
Review of Trial Transcript and Arguments for Appeal. $ 95.00 
February 24, 1994 




February 25, 19 94 
Drafting Appellate Argument on Child Support. $380.00 
March 2, 1994 
Drafting Appellate Brief and research. $190.00 
March 3, 1994 
Research appeal. $190.00 
March 8, 1994 
Drafting Cross Appeal. $380.00 
March 10, 1994 
Drafting Brief on Appeal. $ 95.00 
April 28, 1994 
Drafting of Appellate Argument. $ 95.00 
May 9, 1994 
Review of Brad's Brief. $190.00 
May 19, 1994 
Review of law and research of Brief. $142.50 
May 31, 1994 
Research and drafting Arguments. $142.50 
June 1, 1994 
Phone call. $142.50 
June 2, 1994 
Work on appeal. $ 4 7.50 
June 3, 1994 
Drafting Brief. $380.00 
June 9f 1994 
Drafting Appeal Brief. $ 95.00 
June 16, 1994 
Drafting Appeal. $190.00 
June 23, 1994 
Drafting Appeal. $285.00 
BECKY UDY 
T-5386 
Attorney7 s Fees/Appeal 
June 30, 1994 
Drafting and finalizing Appeal. $285.00 
Estimated time for Hearing and review of Jeff 
Thorne Reply. $950.00 
TOTAL $5,415.00 
Total hours spent on appeal were 57 and were billed at 
$95.0 0 per hour. 
DISCOUNT GIVEN <$915.00> 
TOTAL $4,500.00 
Costs Advanced/Appeal 
February 4, 1994 
Costs advanced to District Court for copies. $119.50 
February 4, 1994 
Costs advanced to Rodney Felshaw for Transcript 
deposit. $ 50.00 
February 16, 1994 
Costs advanced to Rodney Felshaw for Transcript. $214.50 
TOTAL $3 8 4 . 0 0 
TOTAL $ 4 , 8 8 4 . 0 0 
